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Abstract :  Historically, most microfinance providers are in the form of cooperatives, while 
some policies studies recommend shareholders ownership because it can reduce the 
risk of capital costs and charges opportunism manager. This study aims to analyze 
the factors in the cost of ownership that distinguishes MFI with the type of 
cooperative ownership and village banks. The study was conducted by using 
secondary data from the MIX (Microfinance Information Exchange) market year 
2007-2013. The factors Influencing the determinants of MFI ownership costs were 
Analyzed using multiple logistic regression analysis technique. The study found 
that the MFI of cooperative has advantages in operational efficiency and credit risk 
while village banks have advantages in the cost of customer service, cost of debt, 
cost of capital, social performance and financial performance 
 
 




Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) are financial institutions serving the micro segment, 
which are generally poor people who have limited access to finance from formal financial 
institutions. The micro segment can be a business with a micro, small and medium scale in the 
industrial, trade, agricultural, urban and rural areas. The micro segment, which is generally the 
middle to lower economic community, has a high risk of credit services. Credit services in the 
micro segment have high information asymmetry due to generally unavailability of adequate 
financial reports, which increases risk at the credit screening, monitoring and control stages as 
well as the credit payment enforcement stage. 
In microfinance institutions, agency problems and governance design are in accordance 
with the form of microfinance institutions. Historically, most microfinance providers have been 
in the form of cooperatives and donor agencies, while several policy studies have recommended 
forms of share ownership because they reduce the risk of capital costs and managerial 
opportunistic costs (Mersland, 2009). Cooperatives are still needed to reduce the risk of 
information asymmetry in markets with imperfect information (Mersland, 2009). 
Cooperatives have advantages in group-based fund management where owners, 
managers, creditors and debtors are members. This will reduce information asymmetry and 
commitment in managing funds for the common welfare. However, the cooperative has a 
weakness on the scale of the business, because it is limited in collecting funds from third parties 
outside the group. On the other hand, the Village Bank has advantages in collecting third party 
funds, but it has weaknesses in the process of screening, monitoring and enforcing credit because 
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the Bank and customers have interests and information that are not always the same (Dyrnes et 
al., 2015). 
Cooperative-based MFI development will increase member loyalty because members are 
both borrowers of funds and owners of capital. Members as owners will support participation in 
MFI development in general. However, in practice cooperatives often operate like non-bank 
financial institutions and banks, namely low member participation. Village Bank-based MFIs 
provide the most complete financial service opportunities compared to existing financial 
institutions. Cooperative-based MFIs as a financial forum for members need to develop 
strategies in collecting member funds so that the institution can run well. Another alternative is a 
Village Bank with a cooperative owner, namely a Village Bank whose shares are owned by a 
company legally incorporated as a cooperative. 
Comparison of cost of ownership (Mersland, 2009; Dyrnes et al., 2015), the effect of 
ownership type on economic and social performance (Abate et al., 2014; Mersland and Strøm, 
2008; 2010; Simonsen, MS, Mersland, 2009), governance (Chakrabarty and Bass, 2014) have 
described previous research. However, these studies have not included credit risk factors based 
on ownership type. The management of credit agency problems in MFIs with cooperative 
ownership types and village banks can be different due to different organizational characteristics. 
This article re-examines the variables in previous research by including aspects of credit risk and 
discusses them again in the credit agency cost theory approach. Credit agency costs are viewed 
from the cost aspect to reduce credit agency problems and costs as a result of agency costs. The 
credit risk aspect is an important aspect to support the social performance and sustainability of an 
MFI. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Agency theory was first proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The main principle of 
this theory states that there is a working relationship between the party giving the authority (the 
principal) and the party receiving the authority (the agent) in the form of a cooperation contract. 
The agency problem arises because of a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent, 
because the maximum utility does not meet between them. With regard to agency problems, 
positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) implicitly recognizes three forms of 
agency, namely: owner and management (bonus plan hypothesis), creditors to management 
(debt/equity hypothesis) and between government and management (political cost hypothesis). 
Agency cost is an economic concept regarding the cost of the principal whether an 
organization, an individual or a group of people, when the principal selects or hires an "agent" to 
act on his behalf. The two parties have different interests and the agent has more information so 
the owner (principal) cannot directly ensure that the agent always acts in the best interest of the 
owner (principal). These costs consist of two main sources: the costs inherently associated with 
using the agent (for example, the risk that agents will use the organization's resources to their 
own advantage), and the costs of the techniques used to reduce the problems associated with the 
agent's use of information - further findings about what the agent does (for example, financial 
statements of production costs) or uses mechanisms to align agent interests with the principal (eg 
executive compensation with equity payments such as stock options) (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). 
Agency costs in an MFI can be: 1) costs incurred by the principal to reduce agency 
problems, 2) costs as a result of agency problems. Regarding credit agency costs, the costs 
incurred by the principal to reduce agency problems include costs for credit monitoring control 
International Journal of Economics, Business and Accounting Research (IJEBAR)  
Peer Reviewed – International Journal 
Vol-4, Issue-3, 2020 (IJEBAR) 
E-ISSN: 2614-1280 P-ISSN 2622-4771 
http://jurnal.stie-aas.ac.id/index.php/IJEBAR 
 
International Journal of Economics, Business and Accounting Research (IJEBAR) Page 3 
such as in the form of credit staff fees, administrative costs, operational costs. Costs as a result of 
agency problems are in the form of bad credit and inefficient company performance. 
In microfinance institutions, agency fees can differ between several types of MFI 
ownership. According to Chakrabarty and Bass (2014) the ownership types of MFIs consist of 
cooperatives, village banks, non-bank financial institutions and NGOs. Cooperatives/Credit 
Units are financial credit institutions in the form of cooperatives to assist members by combining 
members' personal savings, providing mutual loans and providing other financial services. 
Village Banks are government sponsored / privately run banks that provide credit facilities to 
farmers, traders, or farmer cooperatives or merchant cooperatives for rural communities. 
In an MFI in the form of a cooperative, the members of the cooperative are the owner 
(deposit capital or principal savings), the debtor (through mandatory and voluntary savings) as 
well as the creditor (borrower or user of funds). Agency problems arise between members as 
owners and management (who come from members as well), and owners and management (as 
debtors) with other members as creditors. In an MFI in the form of a bank, the owner 
(institutional capital) can be a third party or a different party from management, debtors and 
creditors. The micro community can play a role in ownership (shares), savings (as debtors) and 
users of funds (creditors). Agency problems arise between: 1) shareholders and management, 2) 
debtors and creditors, 3) majority and minority shareholders. 
Cooperative-based MFIs have several strengths and weaknesses. Based on the concept of 
economic transaction costs (Coase, 1937, 1960; Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996), cooperative-
based MFIs have the advantage of better understanding borrowers than banks or other financial 
institutions. This is because the members and owners of the organization. Administrators and 
members know each other as part of the rural community. This will reduce asymmetry in credit 
screening, group-based monitoring and group-based credit default enforcement. Furthermore, 
cooperative institutions can effectively raise resources (assets) for self-help and self-
development, reduce the risk of credit failure and support the sustainability of the institution. 
The opposite point of view, based on the concept of agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983) identifies the institutional weaknesses of cooperatives. The 
management and cooperative members generally know each other. This will cause feelings of 
reluctance in credit screening, monitoring and enforcement of credit payments. The agricultural 
and market environment also places a high risk of agricultural activity. This condition can cause 
more credit extended to increase credit risk. On the other hand, the MFI market segment is 
generally too poor to save. This will cause limitations in raising internal resources for 
institutional independence. The greater the credit that is distributed can not easily help increase 
credit risk. Based on this description, it can be concluded that the greater the credit channeled 
does not necessarily support the sustainability of the institution. 
Mersland (2009) explains that the cost of information asymmetry in cooperatives is, on 
average, lower than the cost of share ownership. The costs associated with controlling-
monitoring of the MFI's nutmeg manager with share ownership type are better than those of 
cooperatives, but the costs associated with monitoring cooperative credit control are better than 
share ownership. Share ownership has a lower cost of capital ownership and supports the 
increase in MFI capital by attracting new investors into the MFI sector. However, the research 
results also show that cooperatives are more effective at reducing the cost of market contracts, 
and these results are particularly relevant because most microfinance organizations (MFIs) 
operating in markets are very inefficient. 
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Mersland and Strom (2008) in addition to comparing the costs between several types of 
ownership also analyze the effect of agency costs based on ownership types on performance. 
Cost is defined as the sum of financial costs and transaction costs to clients, while performance is 
measured from cost performance, depth of coverage, service coverage, duration of service 
provision, scope and feasibility. Depth is defined as the client's poverty level or other social 
preferences such as the percentage of service to female clients. Service coverage is defined as the 
number of customers served. The duration of service provision and scope is defined as the 
number of financial contract types provided. Mersland and Strom (2008) also found that 
customer costs (cost of client), operational costs (operational costs), cost of debt (debt cost), and 
cost of capital (equity cost) differ between several types of MFI ownership. 
In contrast to the research of Mersland and Strom (2008), other researchers found little 
evidence to suggest that the type of ownership affects operational efficiency. In a large European 
study, Iannotta et al. (2007) found that banks have higher profitability, but have higher operating 
costs than non-bank MFIs. 
Simonsen and Mersland (2009) analyzed the effect of MFI ownership type on social 
performance. The study was conducted on 478 MFIs from 77 countries in the period 1996 to 
2012. The type of ownership is more focused on NGOs with ownership of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and company shareholders. The results of the study found that only the 
percentage of female customers has a significant effect on the cost of ownership. This may 
indicate that MFIs with NGO ownership have a higher average percentage of borrowing than 
share ownership. Meanwhile, other variables such as the depth of outreach to the poor were not 
significant between NGO ownership and share ownership. This also implies that profit 
(commercial) and non-profit orientations do not differentiate the service coverage of the poorest 
segments of society. 
Dyrnes et al. (2015) analyzed the effect of ownership type on costs in MFIs. The study 
used panel data from 403 microfinance institutions in 74 countries. Data analysis used least 
squares regression analysis (OLS). This type of ownership focuses on non-profit cooperative 
organizations and shareholders. The results of the study found no significant differences in 
operating costs, employee costs or personnel productivity between non-profit MFIs and 
shareholders. The results of this study contradict the theory of cost of ownership and agency 
costs, which explain that organizations with share ownership have a lower cost of capital than 
non-profit companies. Another contradictory outcome of the anchovies is that MFIs with 
cooperative ownership should have lower operating costs, lower employee costs and labor 
productivity than MFIs that are shareholder-owned. This influence has in recent years been 
reduced by the inclusion of control variables. 
Abate et al. (2014) analyzed the cost efficiency and outreach of services for the poor, 
including LKM. The analysis was carried out using a stochastic frontier approach in MFIs in 
Ethiopia. The results of the study found that it shows a trade-off between outreach to the poor 
and cost efficiency, indicating difficulty in trying to achieve two goals at once. MFIs with 
cooperative ownership type have better service coverage to the poor than MFIs that are owned 
by shareholders. According to Mersland (2009), cooperatives are less commercial and 
professional because they do not have owners with monetary incentives to monitor management. 
Conversely, share ownership has the benefit of being able to access more funds better than 
cooperatives. 
Based on the description above, the hypothesis can be formulated as follows. 
H1. Customer costs are lower for cooperative ownership type MFIs than for Village banks. 
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H3. Debt costs are higher for cooperative ownership type MFIs than village banks. 
H2. Operational costs are lower for cooperative ownership type MFIs than for Village banks. 
H4. Capital costs are higher for cooperative ownership type MFIs than village banks. 
H5. Social performance is higher for MFIs with cooperative ownership type compared to Village 
banks. 
H6. Profitability performance is higher for MFIs with the Village Bank ownership type 
compared to cooperatives. 
H7. Business sustainability is higher for MFIs with the Village Bank ownership type compared 
to cooperatives. 
H8. Credit risk is higher for MFIs with cooperative ownership types than for Village banks. 
 
3. Research Method 
This reserach used secondary data, namely profiles and financial reports of 443 MFIs 
from 1998 to 2013 in 105 countries (Africa, Latin America, South and East Asia), which were 
collected from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX). The data source is the publication 
data of financial reports and MFI profiles published online at http://www.mixmarket.org.  
 
Table 1. Variable and Measurement 
Variable Operational Description 
MFI Ownership Type Cooperative =1, Village Bank =0 
Cooperatives/Credit Units are financial credit 
institutions in the form of cooperatives to assist 
members by pooling members' personal savings, 
providing mutual loans and providing other financial 
services ”(CGAP, 1999). Village Banks are government 
sponsored / privately run banks that provide credit 
facilities to farmers, traders, or farmer cooperatives or 
merchant cooperatives for rural communities (NSCB, 
2012). 
Customer Fees Total Fees / Borrower 
Debt Costs Total Expenses / Payable 
Operating costs Operating Costs / Loan Portfolio 
Capital Costs Natural Logarithm of Equity 
Social Performance Depth of Service (Outreach) = Outreach  
Poorest people (3 = high, 2 = medium 1 = low) 
Profitability Performance Return on assets (ROA) 
Business Sustainability Operational self sufficiency: Operating Expenses / Operating 
Income 
Credit Risk Portfolio at risk, Portfolios at risk > 90 days / Total 
Loan Portfolio 
 
Ownership costs between MFIs in the form of cooperatives and Village Banks are 
compared from the following aspects: customer costs (cost of clients), operational costs 
(operational costs), debt costs (debt cost), and capital costs (equity cost) and the impact of 
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agency problems. The impact of agency problems is measured by the impact on credit risk, 
financial performance, social performance and the sustainability of the MFI. Social performance 
is measured from the outreach of services to the poor. The factors in agency costs that 
differentiate MFIs from the type of ownership of the Cooperative and Village Bank are analyzed 
in the logit function as follows: 
 
Log [pi/(1-pi)] = α +β1CONT +β2DEBC +β3OPC +β4CAP +β5REG  
 +β6OR +β7NPL +β8ROA +β9SUS +  
Where: α = constant, β = regression coefficient, ε = error factor (residual), E = Log [pi / (1-pi)] = 
Log LKM with ownership of Cooperative (pi) or and Village Bank (1-Pi) ( binary: 1/0), CONT = 
Customer Costs, DEBC = debt costs, OPC = Operational Costs, CAP = Capital Costs, REG = 
regulated / not, OR = Poor Community Service Coverage, NPL = Bad Credit Risk for more than 
90 days, ROA = Return on Asset, SUS = LKM sustainability. To assess the accuracy of the 
regression function on the observed value, it can be seen from the goodnessfit value. The 
goodness of fit statistic can be measured from the statistical value of the Hosmer and Lemeshow 
Goodness-of-fit statistics and the coefficient of determination. The coefficient of determination 
(Cox and Snell's R Square and Nagelkerke's R²) is used to determine the percentage change in 
the dependent variable caused by the independent variable. Statistics Hosmer and Lemeshow 
Goodness-of-fit is a test of the significance of the equation used to determine how the 
independent variable affects the dependent variable (Y). If the Hosmer and Lemeshow 
Goodness-of-fit Statistics value is> than 0.05, it means that the model is able to predict its 
observation value or it can be said that the model is acceptable because it matches the 
observational data (Ghozali: 2007). 
In logistic regression analysis, the interpretation of the calculation results will be carried 
out using the odds ratio or probability (probability). The logit model changes the dependent 
variable 1-0 (happens-does not happen) to be a probability that an event will occur or not occur 
(in this study are MFIs with cooperative ownership type and Village Bank). The logit model 
procedure will predict if the probability is> 0.5 and predict it will not happen if the opposite is 
the probability <0.5 (Ghozali, 2010). 
The assumption of data normality in binary logistic regression cannot be fulfilled because 
the Y value follows the noulli distribution, the variance value is a function of p (probability). Of 
course, in the data we have, this p value varies depending on the explanatory variable X, because 
the p value varies, the variance value also varies so that the variance is heterogeneous. The 
weighted least squares approach can solve this problem. The Iteratively Reweighted Least 
Squares (IRLS) technique can be used as a method of choice other than the maximum likelihood 
(ML) method in estimating logistic regression model parameters. The maximum likelihood 
method is an alternative that can be used (Ghozali, 2010). 
 
4. Result And Discussion 
Result 
Based on table 2, it can be seen that in general village banks are better than cooperatives 
in financial performance (ROA), financial sustainability (Operational self-sufficiency), depth of 
service life (Outreach). Village banks are also better than cooperatives in terms of cost 
performance. The Village Bank has costs per borrower, cost of debt, operating costs), total costs 
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and scale of service. One of the advantages of cooperatives is only in the aspect of personnel 
costs, which are lower than village banks. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
  
Cooperative Village Bank 
mean stdev mean stdev 
Profitability Performance (ROA) 0.011 0.077 0.030 0.031 
Business continuity 1.166 0.658 1.242 0.259 
Social Performance 1.299 0.625 1.592 0.772 
Credit Risk 0.054 0.077 0.073 0.086 
Total Fees / Borrower 224.8 558.9 106.2 166.6 
Total Expenses / Payable 249.7 866.3 111.4 178.9 
Operating Costs / Loan Portfolio 0.226 0.814 0.195 0.129 
Natural Logarithm of Equity 0.089 0.132 0.103 0.065 
Source: MIX Market Data, 2007-2013 
 
The results of the logistic regression equation on the factors that distinguish MFIs from 
the ownership of village banks and cooperatives (Table 3) obtained statistical LR values, each of 
which is significant at an error rate of 1%. These results also show that together or 
simultaneously the factors in the model have a significant effect on differentiating MFIs from the 
ownership of village banks and cooperatives. The results of the regression equation obtained a 
value of R2 (McFadden R-squared) of 0.228 or 22.8%, which reflects that all independent 
variables are able to explain changes in the dependent variable by 22.8%, while the rest is 77.2% 
influenced by other variables not involved. in this research model. 
 
Tabel 3. Regression Test Summary 
 Dependent Variable: 
β p exp 
    
C -1.29 *)   0.092 0.275 
CONT 0.002 ***)   0.000 1.002 
DEBC 7.168 ***)   0.000 1,297 
OPC -3.670 ***)   0.000 0.025 
CAP 1.726 ***)   0.000 5.618 
OR -0.650 ***)   0.000 0.522 
RISK -2.832 ***)   0.000 0.059 
ROA -7.882 ***)   0.000 0.001 
SUS -0.183 0.208 0.833 
    
    
McFadden R-squared 0.228   
LR statistic 344.002   
Prob(LR statistic) 0.000   
Note: ***) level of significancy = 1%, *) level of significancy = 10%  
Source: MIX Market Data, 2007-2013 
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Based on the fit model analysis in the previous sub-chapter, the logistic regression 
equation used in this study is a logistic regression model that includes all variables (15 variables) 
in the research model as follows: 
Log [pi/(1-pi)] = -1.29 +0.002CONT +7.168DEBC -3.670OPC 1.726CAP -0.650OR -
2.832RISK -7.882 ROA -0.183SUS 
The results of hypothesis testing through the Wald test, from 9 (nine) independent 
variables, as many as 8 (eight) variables that have a significant influence in distinguishing 
cooperative form MFIs from village banks. In general, Village Banks have better financial 
performance (ROA), financial sustainability (Operational self-sufficiency), and depth of service 
coverage (Outreach) than cooperatives. Village banks also have lower customer service fees, 
debt costs and capital costs than cooperatives. Cooperatives have lower operating costs and 
credit risk than Village Banks. Business sustainability did not differ significantly between village 
banks and cooperatives. 
Customer service cost (CONT) is a factor that has a significant influence in 
differentiating cooperative MFIs from village banks (p = 0.000 <0.01). The wald-test value of 
0.002 means that the probability of customer service costs at cooperative MFIs is higher at 
e0.002I = 1.002x compared to village banks, provided that other variables are constant. A 
positive Wald-test value or an exponential value of more than 1 indicates that the cooperative has 
higher customer service costs than village banks. 
The cost of debt (DEBC) is a factor that has a significant influence in differentiating MFIs from 
cooperatives and village banks (p = 0.000 <0.01). The wald-test value of 7.168 means that the 
probability of the cost of debt to a cooperative MFI is higher at e7.168 = 1.297x than a village 
bank, provided that other variables are constant. A positive Wald-test value or an exponential 
value of more than 1 indicates that the cooperative has higher debt costs than village banks. 
Operational cost (OPC) is a factor that has a significant influence in differentiating MFIs 
in the form of cooperatives and village banks (p = 0.000 <0.01). The wald-test value of -3,670 
means that the operational cost probability in cooperative-form MFIs is lower by e-3,670 = 
0.025x compared to village banks, provided that other variables are constant. A negative wald-
test value or an exponential value of less than 1 indicates that the cooperative has lower 
operating costs than a village bank. 
The cost of capital (CAP) is a factor that has a significant influence in differentiating cooperative 
MFIs from village banks (p = 0.000 <0.01). The wald-test value of 1.726 means that the 
probability of the cost of capital in cooperative-form MFIs is higher at e1,726 = 5,618x 
compared to village banks, provided that other variables are constant. A positive Wald-test value 
or an exponential value of more than 1 indicates that the cooperative has a higher capital cost 
than a village bank. 
Depth of Service Reach (OR) is a factor that has a significant influence in differentiating 
MFIs from cooperatives and village banks (p = 0.000 <0.01). The wald-test value of 1.726 
means that the probability of the cost of capital in cooperative-form MFIs is lower by e-0.650 = 
0.522x compared to village banks, provided that other variables are constant. A negative wald-
test value or an exponential value of less than 1 indicates that the cooperative has a lower depth 
of service coverage than a village bank. 
Credit Risk (RISK) is a factor that has a significant influence in differentiating MFIs from 
cooperatives and village banks (p = 0.000 <0.01). The wald-test value of -2,832 means that the 
probability of the cost of capital in cooperative-form MFIs is lower by e-2,832 = 0.059x 
compared to village banks, provided that other variables are constant. A negative wald-test value 
International Journal of Economics, Business and Accounting Research (IJEBAR)  
Peer Reviewed – International Journal 
Vol-4, Issue-3, 2020 (IJEBAR) 
E-ISSN: 2614-1280 P-ISSN 2622-4771 
http://jurnal.stie-aas.ac.id/index.php/IJEBAR 
 
International Journal of Economics, Business and Accounting Research (IJEBAR) Page 9 
or an exponential value of less than 1 indicates that the cooperative has lower Credit Risk than 
village banks. 
Profitability Performance (ROA) is a factor that has a significant influence in 
differentiating MFIs from cooperatives and village banks (p = 0.000 <0.01). The wald-test value 
-7,882 means that the probability of the cost of capital in cooperative-form MFIs is lower by e-
2.882 = 0.001x compared to village banks, provided that other variables are constant. A negative 
wald-test value or an exponential value of less than 1 indicates that the cooperative has a lower 
profitability performance than a village bank. 
 
Discussion 
The results of the study found that village banks have better financial performance 
(ROA), financial sustainability (operational self-sufficiency), and depth of service coverage 
(outreach) than cooperatives. Village Banks have advantages in accessing external sources of 
capital. Profitability is a measure to gain investor confidence and access external sources of 
capital. Shareholders provide incentives to monitor profits and this encourages village banks to 
have better financial performance. External capital also increases the scale of services to reach 
the poor. MFIs with the type of ownership of cooperatives or donor institutions also have 
limitations due to limited access to capital from the private sector and outside the regulation of 
the banking authority (C-GAP, 2003; Mersland, 2007; Mersland and Strom, 2007). MFIs with 
share ownership have several owners who are more knowledgeable about banking monitoring 
and operations, thus reducing the cost of monitoring opportunism managers. MFIs with 
shareholder firms also have the advantage of being able to be regulated by banking authorities, 
accepting deposits, providing a greater range of service quality, attracting equity capital from the 
private sector and benefiting from superior corporate governance because they are privately 
owned (Mersland , 2007; Mersland and Strom, 2007). 
External capital increases the efficiency of economies of scale, so that the Village Bank 
also has a service fee per customer, a cost of debt per customer and a lower cost of capital 
compared to cooperatives. Another problem in cooperative-type MFIs is the ability of members 
to save. This places a limit on capital accumulation. Although the cost of customer service, the 
cost of debt per customer and the cost of capital in cooperatives is higher than that of village 
banks, cooperatives have lower operating costs and credit risk than village banks. This is due 
more to the fact that cooperatives are generally managed more simply than banks. 
Apart from lower operating costs, MFIs in the form of cooperatives have advantages in terms of 
credit risk. The scope of services is limited, group-based loans support credit risk reduction. 
Lower lending also results in a lower credit risk impact. 
In terms of business continuity, business continuity does not differ significantly between village 
banks and cooperatives. Even though it is supported by access to external capital, the 
profitability and services of village banks are in line with risks, so that it does not guarantee 
better business sustainability. On the other hand, the cooperative ownership type provides 
incentives for information asymmetry, but many cooperative members have low levels of 
education and limited knowledge of banking monitoring and operations. Members and 
administrators know each other to provide incentives for group monitoring and control credit 
risk, but the management's reluctance towards members makes monitoring control less effective. 
Therefore, even though members have personal incentives to monitor management, it does not 
guarantee business continuity (Mersland, 2007; Mersland and Strom, 2007). 
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5. Conclusion 
The results of the study found differences in the characteristics of credit agency costs in 
MFIs with the type of ownership of cooperatives and village banks. MFIs in the form of 
cooperatives have advantages in operational efficiency and credit risk, while village banks have 
advantages in customer service costs, debt costs, capital costs, social performance and financial 
performance. However, this study has limitations, because both MFIs in the form of cooperatives 
and village banks can overcome their respective weaknesses. Cooperatives can overcome 
external capital access constraints by involving partners (individuals or institutions) as members 
of the cooperative. Meanwhile, village banks can provide credit to group-based customers. The 
two hybrid mechanisms have not been discussed much in this study due to data limitations, so 
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